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Open access under CC The number of studies examining visual perspective during retrieval has recently grown.
However, the way in which perspective has been conceptualized differs across studies.
Some studies have suggested perspective is experienced as either a ﬁrst-person or a
third-person perspective, whereas others have suggested both perspectives can be experi-
enced during a single retrieval attempt. This aspect of perspective was examined across
three studies, which used different measurement techniques commonly used in studies
of perspective. Results suggest that individuals can experience more than one perspective
when recalling events. Furthermore, the experience of the two perspectives correlated dif-
ferentially with ratings of vividness, suggesting that the two perspectives should not be
considered in opposition of one another. We also found evidence of a gender effect in
the experience of perspective, with females experiencing third-person perspectives more
often than males. Future studies should allow for the experience of more than one perspec-
tive during retrieval.
 2009 Elsevier Inc.Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
When remembering an event, such as a childhood beachside vacation, individuals often report re-experiencing images
related to the event. For example, an individual might visualize him- or herself sitting on the beach, watching as the waves
lap over their feet and the sun shines on their head. Although this imagery can be experienced in several sensory modalities
(e.g., the sound of the waves or the warmth of the sun), visual images are more commonly reported than other modalities
(Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). Rather than simply being frequent, it has been argued that these visual images are inte-
gral to the retrieval of autobiographical memories (e.g., Brewer, 1986; Brewer, 1996; Greenberg & Rubin, 2003; Rubin, 2005;
Rubin & Greenberg, 1998). Thus, to understand autobiographical memory retrieval, we must understand the role of the vi-
sual imagery accompanying retrieval.
One aspect of visual images that has drawn growing attention in recent years is the perspective from which an image is
viewed. In the scenario above, the event is recalled from a third-person perspective; the image originates from an external
viewpoint as though observing the original event as an onlooker. Conversely, an event might be recalled from a ﬁrst-person
perspective, which is an image that originates from the same viewpoint experienced at encoding. These perspectives have
also been referred to as observer and ﬁeld perspectives, respectively (Nigro & Neisser, 1983).
Although the distinction between ﬁrst- and third-person perspectives was ﬁrst introduced over 100 years ago (Freud,
1899/1953; Henri & Henri, 1896), this aspect of imagery was largely ignored until Nigro and Neisser (1983) experimentallyiversity in St. Louis, Department of Psychology, Campus Box 1125, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA.
BY-NC-ND license.
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slowly. Ten years later, a total of eight studies had included a measure of perspective, with only one focusing speciﬁcally
on the role of perspective in retrieval (Robinson & Swanson, 1993). Five years after that, the number had only grown to
18. However, in the past 10 years over 50 additional studies have included a measure of perspective. For example, visual per-
spective has been examined in studies of emotion (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; D’Argembeau, Comblain, & Van Der Linden,
2003; Gollnisch & Averill, 1993; Robinson & Swanson, 1993; Strongman & Kemp, 1991; Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004), ﬂash-
bulb memories (Bohn & Berntsen, 2007; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; Talarico & Rubin, 2007), gender differences (Huebner &
Fredrickson, 1999), cultural differences (Cohen & Gunz, 2002), remember/know judgments of childhood memories (Crawley
& French, 2005), true and false memories (Heaps & Nash, 2001), imagination inﬂation (Libby, 2003; Sharman, Garry, & Hunt,
2005), projecting one’s self into the past and future (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004) and the effect of aging and trau-
matic brain injury on autobiographical memory retrieval (Piolino et al., 2006; Piolino et al., 2007; Piolino et al., 2007).
This growing literature has shown that perspective is not simply an aspect of phenomenology that ‘‘comes along for the
ride” during retrieval, but rather can affect how we think and feel about memories. For example, perspective can affect the
emotional intensity experienced during recall (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Robinson & Swanson, 1993), the type of information
individuals recall (McIsaac & Eich, 2002), and how similarly individuals rate current selves compared to past selves (Libby &
Eibach, 2002; Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005). In addition, perspective seems to play a role in several clinical disorders, such
as depression (Kuyken & Howell, 2006; Lemogne et al., 2006; Williams & Moulds, 2007), social anxiety (e.g., Coles, Turk, &
Heimberg, 2002; Coles, Turk, Heimberg, & Fresco, 2001; Hackmann, Surway, & Clark, 1998; Spurr & Stopa, 2003; Stopa & Bry-
ant, 2004; Wells, Clark, & Ahmad, 1998; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1999), agoraphobia (Day, Holmes, & Hackmann, 2004; Wells
& Papageorgiou, 1999), body dysmorphic disorder (Osman, Cooper, Hackmann, & Veale, 2004), obsessive–compulsive disor-
der (Terry & Barwick, 1995; Terry & Barwick, 1998/1999), and post-traumatic stress disorder (Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin,
2003; Kenny & Bryant, 2007; McIsaac & Eich, 2004; Porter & Birt, 2001).
However, as this literature grows, fundamental questions about the construct still remain unanswered. For example, a
review of the literature reveals that the way perspective has been conceptualized differs substantially across studies. Con-
sider Nigro and Neisser’s (1983) study in which they used the ‘‘terms observer memory and ﬁeld memory for. . . two kinds of
recollection (p. 468).” This terminology, an ‘‘observer memory” or a ‘‘ﬁeld memory,” suggests that a memory is recalled using
only one perspective. For example, when recalling a childhood beach vacation, one would use either a ﬁrst-person perspec-
tive or a third-person perspective. The response alternatives provided to participants by Nigro and Neisser support this char-
acterization; participants could respond ‘‘ﬁeld,” ‘‘observer,” or ‘‘neither.” Many investigations have adopted a similar
methodology (e.g., Brewer & Pani, 1996; Crawley & French, 2005; D’Argembeau et al., 2003; Frank & Gilovich, 1989; Kihl-
strom & Harackiewicz, 1982; Kuyken & Howell, 2006; Libby, 2003; McNamara, Benson, McGenny, Brown, & Albert, 2005;
Robinson & Swanson, 1993; Strongman & Kemp, 1991), which corresponds with the notion that a memory is either ﬁrst-per-
son or third-person.
Others seem to take a similar standpoint but use a different methodology in which participants respond using a contin-
uous scale. For example, Wells and colleagues (1998) used a continuous scale anchored at 3 (ﬁrst-person) and +3 (third-
person) to test the hypothesis that individuals with social phobia would remember social events using a third-person per-
spective when compared to a control group. The mean perspective rating was positive for the social phobia group and neg-
ative for the control group. The authors concluded that ‘‘social phobics took a markedly observer perspective, whereas
controls generally took a ﬁeld perspective” (p. 633). This implies that perspective ratings above the median value of their
scale corresponded to a third-person perspective; those below the median value corresponded to ﬁrst-person perspective.
Thus, memories were experienced as either ﬁrst-person or third-person perspective.
However, two pieces of evidence suggest this is not an accurate characterization of perspective. First, Robinson and Swan-
son (1993) demonstrated that individuals were able to shift the perspective they used during retrieval. That is, if an event
was initially remembered using a ﬁrst-person perspective, individuals could then change their image to a third-person per-
spective after a short delay (see also Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). This suggests a memory is not a ‘‘ﬁrst-person memory” or a
‘‘third-person memory,” but rather perspective can change, along with other aspects of an event, during retrieval.
Second, several studies have demonstrated that the perspective experienced during retrieval can change within a single
retrieval attempt. For example, when remembering a childhood beach vacation, a third-person perspective image may ini-
tially come to mind followed by a ﬁrst-person perspective. The earliest study to hint at this possibility provided two scales to
participants, one corresponding to ﬁrst-person perspective and the other to third-person perspective (Gollnisch & Averill,
1993). This type of measurement suggests the experience of ﬁrst-person and third-person perspectives is independent of
one another; analogous methods have been used by others (Berntsen et al., 2003; Bohn & Berntsen, 2007). Similarly, others
have provided participants with a ‘‘ﬁeld/observer” response in addition to the standard ‘‘ﬁeld” and ‘‘observer” responses
(Piolino, Chetelat et al., 2007; Piolino, Desgranges et al., 2007; Piolino et al., 2004; Piolino et al., 2006; Viard et al., 2007).
In these studies, individuals did make responses consistent with the experience of more than one perspective. However,
these responses were less common than responses indicating the experience of a single perspective. Others have used single
scales that allow for the experience of more than one perspective per retrieval attempt. For example, Porter and Birt (2001)
used a 3-point scale whose values corresponded to ‘‘never seeing one’s self,” ‘‘seeing one’s self sometimes,” and ‘‘always see-
ing one’s self in their image” (see also Huebner & Fredrickson, 1999). These ﬁndings suggest that the experience of one per-
spective does not prohibit the experience of the other, contrary to the notion of ‘‘ﬁrst-person memories” and ‘‘third-person
memories”.
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tive corresponds to a lesser experience of the other. An example of this is provided by a study examining social phobia and
recall of social situations (Coles et al., 2002). Participants responded using a single scale anchored at ‘‘ﬁeld” and ‘‘observer.”
The authors conclude that individuals with social phobias recalled social situations ‘‘from a more observer/less ﬁeld perspec-
tive” than control participants (p. 422). This same characterization is used by the Memory Experiences Questionnaire (Sutin
& Robins, 2007), which measures perspective using 6 questions. Three of the questions pertain to participants’ experience of
a ﬁrst-person perspective questions and the remaining three pertain to third-person perspective. The third-person perspec-
tive ratings are then reverse coded in order to create a perspective score. Thus, a high rating on a third-person perspective
measure is equated with a low rating on a ﬁrst-person perspective scale.
It should be noted that reviewing the manner in which perspective has been discussed and measured is not presented as a
critique, but as a means of illustrating that our understanding of perspective is still rather vague and even conﬂicts across
studies. Furthermore, issues of measurement are raised because they should reﬂect the underlying representation of the con-
struct they measure. For example, using a measure in which participants can respond either ‘‘ﬁrst-person” or ‘‘third-person”
reﬂects a different phenomenological experience from a measure that allows for a mix of perspectives.
Based on this review, there are three common ways of characterizing the experience of perspective. First, memories can
be either ﬁrst-person or third-person, but not both; only one perspective can be experienced during a particular retrieval
attempt. This will be referred to as the ‘‘mutually exclusive framework.” Second, the two perspectives are two ends of a con-
tinuum and are complementary. An individual may be able to experience both perspectives during a single retrieval episode,
but the experience of more of one necessitates the experience of less of the other. This will be referred to as the ‘‘comple-
mentary framework.” Third, individuals can experience both a ﬁrst- and third-person perspective during recall and they are
not dependent on one another; individuals can experience a strong ﬁrst-person perspective and strong third-person perspec-
tive during the same retrieval attempt. This will be referred to as the ‘‘independent framework”.
The current study examines the feasibility of these three frameworks by observing the response patterns provided by
individuals using two measurement techniques favored by perspective studies, as well as a novel technique. If the mutually
exclusive framework is correct, participants’ responses should be consistent with the experience of either a ﬁrst-person or a
third-person perspective, but not both perspectives, regardless of the format of response options. If the complementary
framework is correct, participants should respond in a way that indicates they can experience more than one perspective
during a single retrieval episode; yet, memories that are more third-person should also be less ﬁrst-person, and vice versa.
Finally, if the independent framework is correct, participants should respond in a way that indicates they can experience
more than one perspective during a retrieval episode regardless of the response options they are given. In all three frame-
works, it is possible for participants to respond that they have a very weak experience of both ﬁrst-person and third-person
perspective. However, only in the independent framework can participants respond that they have a very strong experience
of both experiences.
These alternatives were examined in three studies that varied the response options provided to participants. Studies 1
and 2 used response options common to perspective studies. In Study 1, participants responded using a single continuous
scale, anchored at ﬁrst-person and third-person perspective. In Study 2, participants responded using two continuous scales,
one corresponding to ﬁrst-person and the other to third-person. Study 3 used a novel technique in which participants were
asked to describe as many perspectives as they experienced.
In all three studies, participants recalled events from ﬁve speciﬁc time periods spread across their lifetimes. Time periods
were used for two reasons, both of which relate to the ﬁnding that remote memories are more often remembered using a
third-person rather than ﬁrst-person perspective (Frank & Gilovich, 1989; Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Piolino, Desgranges
et al., 2007; Piolino et al., 2006; Robinson & Swanson, 1993; Pronin & Ross, 2006; cf., Brewer & Pani, 1996; Sutin & Robins,
2007; Viard, et al., 2007). First, asking for memories from a range of time periods helped ensure that participants would
experience both ﬁrst- and third-person perspectives. Second, the relationship between perspective and memory age is
one of the most consistent ﬁndings within the perspective literature, which we used to our advantage. Given this ﬁnding
is reliable across studies, we should ﬁnd similar effects with any valid measure of perspective. In addition, if we ﬁnd re-
sponses consistent with the complementary or independent frameworks, a reassessment of previous studies using a dichot-
omous response option may be necessary.
Based on previous ﬁndings showing that, when given the option, individuals respond in a way that indicates the experi-
ence of more than one perspective for a particular memory (e.g., Huebner & Fredrickson, 1999; Piolino et al., 2004; Piolino
et al., 2006, Piolino, Chetelat et al., 2007; Piolino, Desgranges et al., 2007), it was predicted that participants’ responses would
support the independent framework. It was also predicted that the effect of memory age would be observed as in previous
studies. This was based primarily on a study that adopted the ‘‘complementary framework” and found a correlation between
perspective and memory age similar to other studies (Sutin & Robins, 2007). Thus, it was expected that the effect would be
robust enough to hold across measurement techniques.
Finally, given that evidence exists to support the independent framework, one may wonder why an examination of these
frameworks is necessary. The primary motivation is that even though evidence for the independent framework has been pre-
sented, techniques that correspond to the mutually exclusive and complementary frameworks are still most commonly used.
To understand perspective and how it operates in autobiographical memory, there must be agreement about how individ-
uals experience perspective and the way in which perspective is measured should reﬂect this experience. This is particularly
important given the growing number of studies examining perspective. Moreover, a series of three studies using different
880 H.J. Rice, D.C. Rubin / Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 877–890measures, but the same participant population and event cues, will allow a more direct comparison of the common response
measures.
2. Study 1: Are ﬁrst- and third-person perspectives mutually exclusive?
Individuals were asked to recall memories from ﬁve speciﬁc time periods and rate the perspective they experienced using
a single continuous scale anchored at ﬁrst- and third-person perspectives. If perspective is mutually exclusive (i.e., only ﬁrst-
person or third-person perspective can be experienced during a single retrieval episode), intermediate values on the scale
should rarely be endorsed. The use of intermediate values will provide support for either the complementary or independent
frameworks, although it will not be possible to distinguish between the two in this study.
After rating the perspective they experienced for all ﬁve events, participants were then asked to reinstate each memory,
change the perspective they used as much as possible, and then re-rate their perspective. If the experience of perspectives is
mutually exclusive, individuals should shift their rating from one extreme on the scale to the other. However, if intermediate
values are used after shifting perspective, this will provide support for either the complementary or independent framework.
Finally, we examined how perspective ratings changed across time periods to determine if using a single scale would rep-
licate previous studies. We predicted that more remote memories would be rated as more third-person perspective than re-
cent memories. We also examined gender differences in the experience of perspective; previous studies suggest females
experience third-person perspectives more often than males (Huebner & Fredrickson, 1999).
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
1191 Duke University undergraduates (706 females; mean age = 18.75) were tested in large group settings for partial
class credit.
2.1.2. Materials and procedure
Participants read a short description of the distinction between remembering an event through one’s own eyes (ﬁrst-per-
son) or from an observer’s perspective (third-person; see Appendix for full description). They were then asked to recall one
event from each of the following ﬁve time periods: before ﬁrst grade, during elementary school, during middle school/junior
high, during high school, during college. Approximately half of the participants (n = 694) recalled the events in chronological
order (i.e., before ﬁrst grade to during college), whereas the remaining participants recalled events in the reverse order (i.e.,
during college to before ﬁrst grade). Participants indicated the perspective they used when imaging the event using the fol-
lowing scale, ‘‘When remembering the event, do you see the event through your own eyes or as an outside observer?” Re-
sponses were anchored at ‘‘own eyes” and ‘‘observer” (1 = own eyes; 7 = observer).
After recalling all ﬁve events and rating their perspective, participants were asked to change their perspective and re-rate
their perspective. Participants were given the following instructions: ‘‘Now that you have rated your memory on whether it
came to you through your own eyes or as an outside observer, we would like you to try to switch your perspective. In other
words, if the last memory you rememberedwas through your own eyes, wewould like you to try and switch your perspective,
so that you now see the scene as though you were observing it, and vise versa. After you try to change your perspective we
would like you to re-rate thememory on the same scale that you used before. For example, if you rated thememory as a 2 before
and when you try to change your perspective you can’t, we want you to rate your memory as a 2 again. If you can change your
perspective so that you see it a little bit more as an observer, but not completely you might rate it as a 4 or 5. If you can com-
pletely change your perspective and see your memory completely as an observer, then you might rate it as a 7 now.”
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Original perspective ratings – distribution of responses
The distribution of responses for each time period were examined to determine whether individuals used all available
responses or primarily endorsed extremes on the scale. Table 1 displays the number of times each response on theTable 1
Frequency of initial rating responses (on scale from 1–7) for each time period in Study 1.
Initial response Before elementary Elementary school Middle school High school College
1 – First-person 252 (21%) 237 (20%) 287 (24%) 426 (36%) 550 (47%)
2 139 (12%) 188 (16%) 199 (17%) 211 (18%) 209 (18%)
3 98 (8%) 165 (14%) 139 (12%) 142 (12%) 98 (8%)
4 69 (6%) 98 (8%) 126 (11%) 72 (6%) 72 (6%)
5 135 (11%) 165 (14%) 172 (14%) 128 (11%) 84 (7%)
6 242 (21%) 197 (16%) 161 (13%) 129 (11%) 94 (8%)
7 – Third-person 242 (21%) 138 (12%) 103 (9%) 79 (6%) 71 (6%)
Note: Percentage of memories given each rating for each time period presented in parentheses.
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(i.e., 1 or 7) were as follows: before ﬁrst grade – 58.03%, elementary school – 68.43%, middle school – 67.14%, high school –
57.46%, college – 47.28%. Thus, participants used intermediate values and responses were not limited to the two extremes,
contrary to the mutually exclusive framework.
2.2.2. Original perspective ratings – effect of time, gender, and questionnaire order
To examine the relationship between perspective and memory age, participants’ perspective ratings were subjected to a
ﬁve (time period: before ﬁrst grade, elementary school, middle school, high school and college)  2 (questionnaire order:
chronological or reverse chronological)  2 (gender: female or male) mixed model ANOVA treating time period as a with-
in-subject factor and all other variables as between-subjects factors. Unless otherwise stated, statistical signiﬁcance was
set at p < .05.
As expected from previous literature, there was a main effect of time period, F(4, 4608) = 131.48, in which remote mem-
ories were rated as more third-person than recent memories (see Fig. 1, Panel A). Post-hoc comparisons indicated all time
periods were signiﬁcantly different from each another, smallest t(1152) = 14.51. There was a signiﬁcant main effect of ques-
tionnaire order, F(1, 1152) = 37.15, such that remembering a college memory ﬁrst (i.e., reverse chronological order) led to a
greater experience of third-person perspective regardless of time period. There was a signiﬁcant effect of gender,
F(1, 1152) = 8.20, with females rating their memories as more third-person than males (see Table 2 for summary). All inter-
actions were nonsigniﬁcant. Thus, we were able to replicate previous ﬁndings using a continuous scale; more remote mem-
ories were remembered using a third-person perspective more often than recent memories (see Fig. 1, Panel A). In addition,
we found that females were more likely to use a third-person perspective than males, similar to previous ﬁndings (Huebner
& Fredrickson, 1999).
2.2.3. Change perspective ratings – distribution of responses
In order to examine whether or not individuals shifted their perspective ratings in a continuous manner, responses were
examined as a function of participants’ initial ratings and change ratings. For example, the number of memories given an
initial rating of 1 and a change rating of 1 across all time periods was determined, as well as the number of memories given
an initial rating of 2 and change rating of 1, an initial rating of 3 and change rating of 1, etc., regardless of time period. From
Fig. 2, it is clear that participants made their change ratings in a continuous manner. That is, rather than beginning at, or near,
a 1 and then shifting to a 7, or vice versa, it was common to begin at an intermediate value and shift to an intermediate value.
Table 3 presents the frequency counts for each change rating separately for each time period, which also makes clear that
intermediate values were commonly used for change ratings.
2.2.4. Change perspective ratings – effect of time
In addition, we examined how time affected the ability to shift perspective by examining howmuch ratings changed from
the initial retrieval to the second retrieval. To do this, we must consider that the amount of change possible was limited by
individuals’ initial ratings. For example, a rating of 1 or 7 could move 6 points, whereas a rating of 3 or 5 could only move 4
points. Because of this, a proportion change score was calculated (i.e., actual change/maximum possible change) to examine
perspective change normalized by total change possible. For example, if an individual ﬁrst rated their perspective as a 1 and
then changed to a 5, their proportion change would be 4/6, or .67. If an individual started at a 6 and changed to 3, their
proportion change score would be 3/5 or .60. Analyzes were limited to participants with both original and change ratings for
all ﬁve time periods (n = 996, females = 598). The means are presented in Table 4.
To examine the effect of time period, questionnaire order, and gender on proportion change, data were subjected to a
5  2  2 ANOVA. There was a signiﬁcant main effect of time period, F(4, 3968) = 46.34. Post-hoc t-tests revealed no differ-
ence between high school and college time periods, t(992) = 0.78, but all other time periods were different from each other,
smallest t(992) = 4.06. There was no main effect of questionnaire order, F(1, 992) = 2.74, or gender, F(1, 992) = 1.76. TheFig. 1. Perspective responses from Study 1 (Panel A), Study 2 (Panel B), and Study 3 (Panel C). Panel A shows participants’ mean perspective ratings using a
single scale to rate memories from ﬁve different time periods. Panel B shows mean responses on two perspective scales, one referring to ﬁrst-person
perspective and the other to third-person perspective, for the same ﬁve time periods. Mean responses on a vividness scale are also depicted. Panel C shows
the proportion of third-person perspective reported by participants for the same ﬁve time periods. Standard errors are shown in Panels A and B.
Table 2
Means and standard deviations of visual perspective ratings by gender and questionnaire order across time in Study 1.
Time period Female Male
Chron. Reverse chron. Chron. Reverse chron.
Before ﬁrst grade 4.23 (2.27) 4.44 (2.31) 3.82 (2.27) 4.27 (2.31)
Elementary school 3.73 (2.08) 4.10 (2.31) 3.44 (2.14) 3.83 (1.97)
Middle school 3.35 (2.01) 3.98 (2.09) 3.05 (2.01) 3.71 (1.94)
High school 2.74 (1.97) 3.42 (2.13) 2.71 (1.94) 3.22 (2.10)
College 2.36 (1.83) 3.01 (2.17) 2.37 (1.92) 2.66 (1.95)
Note: Signiﬁcant main effects of gender and questionnaire order were observed. Chron. = Questionnaire order beginning at ‘‘Before ﬁrst grade” and ending
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Fig. 2. The number of memories given all combination of initial perspective ratings and ratings after participants were asked to change their perspective.
Numbers represent raw frequencies.
Table 3
Frequency of change rating responses (on scale from 1–7) for each time period in Study 1.
Change response Before elementary Elementary school Middle school High school College
1 79 (8%) 68 (7%) 84 (8%) 130 (13%) 113 (11%)
2 103 (10%) 119 (12%) 140 (14%) 112 (11%) 116 (12%)
3 182 (18%) 156 (16%) 146 (15%) 114 (12%) 107 (11%)
4 169 (17%) 190 (19%) 141 (14%) 110 (11%) 127 (13%)
5 183 (18%) 172 (17%) 169 (17%) 159 (16%) 161 (16%)
6 164 (17%) 175 (17%) 186 (19%) 178 (18%) 172 (17%)
7 116 (12%) 116 (12%) 130 (13%) 193 (19%) 200 (20%)
Note: Percentage of memories with each change rating response for each time period presented in parentheses.
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caused by minor differences that have no clear theoretical interpretation. No other interaction was signiﬁcant.
3. Study 2: First- and third-person perspective as independent
In Study 1, individuals did use intermediate values to rate their perspective when given a continuous scale, as well as
when they were asked to change their perspective. These types of responses are inconsistent with the mutually exclusive
framework, and are consistent with both the complementary or separate-by-related frameworks. However, it is unclear
which of these two is a more appropriate representation based on this study. Furthermore, a potential critique of the studyTable 4
Means and standard deviations of change ratings across time periods and questionnaire order in Study 1.
Time period Chron. Reverse chron.
Before ﬁrst grade 0.50 (0.32) 0.43 (0.37)
Elementary school 0.56 (0.35) 0.50 (0.36)
Middle school 0.51 (0.43) 0.50 (0.41)
High school 0.62 (0.39) 0.63 (0.33)
College 0.61 (0.39) 0.62 (0.32)
Note: Signiﬁcant main effect of time period was observed, as well as an interaction between time period and questionnaire order. Chron. = Questionnaire
order beginning at ‘‘Before ﬁrst grade” and ending with ‘‘College”; Reverse Chron. = Questionnaire order beginning at ‘‘College” and ending with ‘‘Before ﬁrst
grade.” SD presented in parentheses.
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represent a mixture of ﬁrst- and third-person perspectives? Or it is possible that a 5, for example, represents a less vivid
third-person perspective? If the latter is true, the endorsement of intermediate values may not be inconsistent with the
mutually exclusive framework.
Thus, to further investigate the underlying representation of perspective, in Study 2 participants were asked to rate their
perspective using two scales, one referring to the experience of ﬁrst-person perspective and the other to the experience of
third-person perspective. If the experience of the two perspectives is mutually exclusive, participants should rate their expe-
rience of one perspective as very high on one scale and very low on the other. If the experience of perspective is complemen-
tary, as ratings move closer to one extreme on one scale, they should move closer to the opposite extreme on the other scale.
If the two perspectives are independent, ratings on the two scales should be independent of one another.
In addition, participants were asked to rate the vividness of their imagery. This was done to examine the distinction be-
tween the complementary and independent frameworks. Previous studies have found ﬁrst-person perspectives to be asso-
ciated with more vivid imagery than third-person perspectives (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson & Swanson, 1993). Given
this, there are several possible relationships that could be observed between vividness and the two perspective scales, and
that would be interpretable within our frameworks. First, ﬁrst-person ratings will correlate positively with vividness ratings,
whereas third-person ratings will correlate negatively with vividness ratings. This pattern would suggest that perspective is
complementary. Second, ratings of one perspective will correlate with vividness, whereas the other perspective will not. This
pattern would suggest that perspective is independent. Third, neither perspective will correlate with vividness, which would
suggest that the relationship observed in previous studies may have been a function of the measurement method used.
The effect of time was also examined with the expectation that more remote memories would be rated as more third-
person and less ﬁrst-person than recent memories. In addition, gender differences and the effect of questionnaire order were
examined given the effects observed in Study 1.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
405 Duke University undergraduates (258 females; mean age = 18.84) were tested in large group settings for partial class
credit.
3.1.2. Materials and procedure
Participants ﬁrst read a description of the distinction between ﬁrst- and third-person perspectives in memory and re-
called an event from ﬁve time periods as in Experiment 1 (see Appendix for exact instructions). Approximately half of the
participants (n = 212) recalled the events in chronological order (i.e., before ﬁrst grade to during college), whereas the
remaining participants recalled events in the reverse order (i.e., during college to before ﬁrst grade). First, participants rated
the vividness of each memory on a 7-point scale (1 = not vivid at all, 7 = as vivid as if it were happening now). Then they
rated perspective using two separate 7-point scales. One scale referred to the degree the participant experienced the mem-
ory from their own eyes (1 = not at all, 7 = completely) and the other to the experience of an observer’s perspective (1 = not at
all, 7 = completely).
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Distribution of responses
To examine which of the three frameworks participant responses were most consistent with, the distribution of ﬁrst- and
third-person perspective ratings were examined by plotting the total number of memories given all combination of the two
ratings. Fig. 3A depicts the meaning of different response types, while the right panel presents the total number of memories








4 3 2 9 4 22 87
6 3 3 3 45 120 13
1 2 15 19 91 63 9
1 10 22 104 48 29 5
17 42 90 33 62 15 3
54 200 68 30 27 30 7





















































- - - - - -
- -



















Fig. 3. The number of memories given all combination of ﬁrst- and third-person perspective ratings. The panel to the left shows the hypothetical location of
memory counts based on whether perspective is considered mutually exclusive (E), complementary (C & E), or using a more lenient criterion that allows for
noise above (+) or below () the complementary characterization. The panel to the right shows the total number of memories given each particular rating
by participants.
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person (i.e., ‘‘7” and ‘‘1”), or no perspective (i.e., ‘‘1” and ‘‘1”). These are labeled in Panel A with an ‘‘E” for exclusive. If ﬁrst-
and third-person perspectives are complementary, responses should fall on the rightward leaning diagonal (cells labeled ‘‘C”
and ‘‘E” in Panel A). For example, a rating of 3 on the ﬁrst-person scale should result in a rating of 5 on the third-person scale
(i.e., the reverse coding of 5 would be 8–5, or 3). Some noise in this type of judgment is expected; thus, a complimentary
framework would likely produce responses within cells labeled C + 1 and C  1 in Panel A. If ﬁrst- and third-person perspec-
tives are experienced independently, data points should fall across all cells.
Examining the actual data points (in Panel B), responses consistent with a mutually exclusive framework account for only
27.44% of the data. In addition, 22.60% of all memories were given a rating of 4 or higher on both scales. This suggests that,
when given the opportunity, individuals will report ﬁner distinctions in perspective than ‘‘ﬁrst-person,” ‘‘third-person,” or
‘‘neither.” Taking the complementary framework by turning to the diagonal reveals that 57.24% of the data are accounted
for by a single-scale approach. This increases the amount of data accounted for by the model; however, approximately half
of the data still lie outside of this area. Examining the distribution of responses, much of the data fall near the diagonal or
below with the majority of memories falling in a somewhat Gaussian distribution around the main diagonal. If we extend
our area of interest to one cell above and below the diagonal in line with a more lenient complementary framework (labeled
C + 1 and C  1 cells in Fig. 3A), 80.64% of the data are accounted for; two cells above and below the diagonal accounts for
90.82% of the data.
Although this lenient complementary approach accounts for much of the data, it is clear that a substantial amount of the
data lies below the diagonal in the area representing the experience of more than one perspective. Using a hybrid of the com-
plementary and independent frameworks, in which data points one cell above the single-scale diagonal and all cells below
are considered, accounts for 95.80% of the data. Examining the time periods separately reveals that using this hybrid ap-
proach accounts for more data for recent memories. For example, 87.65% and 88.25% of the data for high school and college
memories are accounted for, respectively, using the lenient complementary approach. Using the hybrid of the complemen-
tary and independent frameworks account for 99.26% and 97.75% of the data. Thus, while the complementary framework
does an adequate job of predicting participant responses, the independent framework is more inclusive. This is primarily
because individuals do, in fact, report a strong experience of more than one perspective, particularly for recent memories.
3.2.2. Relationship between perspective and vividness
The distribution of responses provided support for the independent framework, although it could be argued that the com-
plementary framework predicted participant responses adequately. To further investigate these two frameworks, the rela-
tionship between perspective ratings and vividness were examined. Correlation coefﬁcients were calculated between
these three ratings (i.e., ﬁrst-person perspective, third-person perspective, imagery vividness) for each time period
separately.
Across all ﬁve time periods ﬁrst- and third-person perspective ratings were highly negatively correlated, r = .75, .79,
.78, .68, .62, in order from remote to recent, all ps < .0001 (degrees of freedom for the time periods were 404, 402, 405,
405, 400, respectively). First-person ratings were positively correlated with vividness ratings, r = .29, .33, .24, .24, .20, all
ps < .0001. However, the only time period in which third-person perspective ratings correlated with vividness ratings was
the ‘‘elementary school time period,” r(402) = .13, p = .007. All other time periods were nonsigniﬁcant, r = .05, .10,
.06, .02, all ps > .07. Although ﬁrst- and third-person perspectives were strongly negatively related, only ﬁrst-person per-
spective ratings were related to vividness ratings. This provides additional evidence that the experience of the two perspec-
tives is independent rather than complementary.
To further examine the relationship between the experience of perspective and vividness ratings, participants’ vividness
ratings were examined as a function of their perspective ratings. More speciﬁcally, four categories were created based on
perspective ratings: primarily ﬁrst-person perspective (i.e., ﬁrst-person rating greater than 4 and third-person less than
5), primarily third-person perspective (i.e., third-person greater than 4 and ﬁrst-person less than 5), strong experience of
both perspectives (i.e., both perspectives rated greater than 4), and no distinct experience of perspective (both perspectives
rated less than 5). Vividness ratings were compared across these groups using a four-level between-subjects ANOVAs for
each time period. All ANOVAs were signiﬁcant, F = 8.03, 14.81, 6.24, 4.76, and 3.80 (in order from before ﬁrst grade to college
memories). Means are presented in Table 5, along with pairwise comparisons using Tukey’s HSD correction. The four mostTable 5
Vividness ratings as a function of perspective experience when measuring with 2 scales in Study 2.
Time period Multiple First-person Third-person No distinct
Before ﬁrst grade 4.31 (1.92)a 4.06 (1.48)bc 3.57 (1.55)b 3.05 (1.44)ac
Elementary school 5.26 (1.06)ad 4.87 (1.35)bc 4.14 (1.31)bd 3.88 (1.33)ac
Middle school 5.39 (1.15)ad 5.20 (1.20)bc 4.74 (1.23)bd 4.61 (1.32)ac
High school 6.22 (0.92)d 6.04 (1.01)b 5.59 (1.40)bd 5.67 (1.15)
College 6.42 (0.78)ad 6.16 (1.06) 5.88 (1.06)d 5.74 (1.26)a
Note: Within each time period, matching letters indicate signiﬁcant pairwise comparisons.
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rated low on both perspective scales, (2) memories with multiple perspectives were more vivid than those with a primarily
third-person perspective, (3) memories accompanied by a primarily ﬁrst-person perspective were rated as more vivid than
memories rated low on both perspective scales, and (4) memories accompanied by a primarily ﬁrst-person perspective were
more vivid than memories accompanied by a primarily third-person perspective.
To summarize, vividness ratings correlated with ﬁrst-person perspective ratings, but not with third-person perspective
ratings, providing support for the independent framework. Generally, memories with a strong experience of both perspec-
tives and memories with a strong experience of a ﬁrst-person perspective were more vivid than memories with a strong
experience of third-person perspective or a weak experience of both perspectives. These ﬁndings are consistent with previ-
ous studies, but extend them, ﬁnding that memories associated with more than one perspective are more similar to mem-
ories experienced with a ﬁrst-person perspective when considering the vividness of the memory.
3.2.3. Effect of time, gender, and questionnaire order
To investigate changes in perspective and vividness across time, participants’ ratings of ﬁrst-person, third-person, and
vividness were each subjected to a 5 (time period: before ﬁrst grade, elementary school, middle school, high school and col-
lege)  2 (gender: female or male) ANOVA with time period treated as a within-subject factor. Means from each time period
for the three ANOVAs are summarized in Fig. 1 (Panel B).
First-person perspective ratings showed a signiﬁcant main effect of time period, F(4, 1568) = 86.81, with post-hoc com-
parisons revealing all time periods different from one another, smallest t(392) = 5.78. There was also a main effect of gender,
F(1, 392) = 6.72, such that females rated their memories as less ﬁrst-person than males (females: Mbefore ﬁrst = 3.90,
Melementary = 4.41, Mmiddle school = 4.71, Mhigh school = 5.49, Mcollege = 5.59; males: Mbefore ﬁrst = 4.05, Melementary = 4.91,
Mmiddle school = 5.19, Mhigh school = 5.70, Mcollege = 5.96). There was no effect of questionnaire order, F(1, 392) = 1.05. All
interactions were nonsigniﬁcant.
Third-person ratings also showed a signiﬁcant main effect of time period, F(4, 1564) = 22.52. Post-hoc comparisons re-
vealed the comparisons between ‘‘elementary school” and ‘‘middle school,” and ‘‘high school” and college” ratings were
not signiﬁcant, t(391) = 2.87 and 3.73, respectively. All other comparisons were signiﬁcant, smallest t(391) = 7.90. The effect
of gender was also signiﬁcant, F(1, 391) = 8.71, such that females rated their memories as more third-person perspective
than males (females: Mbefore ﬁrst = 4.06, Melementary = 3.84, Mmiddle school = 3.67, Mhigh school = 3.30, Mcollege = 3.14; males:
Mbefore ﬁrst = 3.71, Melementary = 3.30, Mmiddle school = 3.15, Mhigh school = 2.89, Mcollege = 2.68). There was no effect of questionnaire
order, F(1, 391) = 1.10. All interactions were nonsigniﬁcant.
Finally, vividness ratings showed a signiﬁcant main effect of time period, F(4, 1564) = 341.31. Post-hoc comparisons re-
vealed all time periods were different from each other, t(391) = 6.70. The main effect of gender was not signiﬁcant,
F(1, 391) = 2.09. The effect of questionnaire order was signiﬁcant, F(1, 391) = 68.90, such that participants given the
chronological questionnaire order rated their memories as more vivid (chronological: Mbefore ﬁrst = 3.91, Melementary = 4.89,
Mmiddle school = 5.42, Mhigh school = 6.27, Mcollege = 6.44; reverse chronological: Mbefore ﬁrst = 3.43, Melementary = 4.10,
Mmiddle school = 4.56, Mhigh school = 5.62, Mcollege = 5.75). Interactions were all nonsigniﬁcant.
Thus, the experience of perspective changes in a similar manner to that observed in Study 1. Remote memories were
experienced with less ﬁrst-person perspective and more third-person perspective than recent memories. Females reported
less ﬁrst-person perspective and more third-person perspective than males in agreement with the gender effect observed in
Study 1. In addition, remote memories were less vivid. Similarly to Study 1, there was an effect of questionnaire order;
remembering events in chronological order resulted in more vivid memories.
Taken as a whole, the analyses of vividness and perspective suggest that it might take more information to form a strongly
ﬁrst-person perspective than a strongly third-person perspective, or conversely that a strong ﬁrst-person perspective is
accompanied by more vivid information.
4. Study 3: Experiencing more than one perspective during retrieval
Results from Study 2 provide additional support for the assertion that individuals can experience more than one perspec-
tive when remembering an event and that the independent framework is the most accurate characterization of perspective.
In addition, a gender effect was observed; females rated their memories as more third-person and less ﬁrst-person than
males. An effect of questionnaire order was also observed, but only for vividness ratings.
Study 3 examined the ability to experience more than one perspective during retrieval using a more direct method than
the standard method of asking participants to rate their experience of perspective. Instead, individuals were asked to de-
scribe their experience of perspective. In addition, we examined the relationship between perspective and vividness by ask-
ing participants to rate several aspects of their visual images, as well as the effect of time and gender.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Eighty-six Duke University undergraduates (49 females; mean age = 18.86) were tested individually or in small groups.
886 H.J. Rice, D.C. Rubin / Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 877–8904.1.2. Materials and procedure
Participants were told they would be recalling several events from their lives. The experimenter then read aloud a
description of perspective to participants as they read along. The description provided concrete examples of perspectives
one might use when recalling an event, including ﬁrst-person perspective and a few third-person perspectives. It also ex-
plained how to describe the location of these perspectives. Speciﬁcally, participants were asked to describe, in as much detail
as possible, the relative location of their perspective in relation to their original location during the event. For example,
remembering giving a presentation given in front of classmates from the perspective of the classmates perspective, one
might report the perspective as being directly in front of the original location, approximately 20 feet away, and slightly be-
low eye level. Participants were instructed that if they experienced multiple perspectives, they should describe them all and
then demarcate their dominant perspective.
Participants were then presented with 15 cues, in a pseudo-randomized order, and asked to describe their perspectives.
Five cues were the same time periods used in Studies 1 and 2. Ten additional cues were used, but not analyzed here in order
to have the same ﬁve events for all analyses (see Rice, 2007). Participants also rated three aspects of their images on 7-point
scales: how clear was their dominant perspective (1 = not clear at all, 7 = very clear and obvious), how integral was their
dominant perspective to the memory (1 = not integral at all, 7 = very integral), and did they feel the memory came with a
distinct perspective (1 = had to force perspective, 7 = came with a distinct perspective)?4.2. Results
4.2.1. Experience of more than one perspective
A total of 429 memories were obtained due to one missing data point (i.e., 86 individuals each with ﬁve time periods).
Participants described 65.67% of their dominant perspectives as third-person. Sixty-nine percent of participants reported
more than one perspective for at least one memory. A total of 131 memories (30.54%) were accompanied by more than 1
perspective. Eight memories were accompanied by three different perspectives; given the small number these will not be
discussed further. From this, it is clear that individuals do experience more than one perspective when remembering a single
event.
Table 6 displays the perspectives reported for secondary memories as a function of dominant perspectives. When two
perspectives were experienced, it was more common for participants to experience a ﬁrst-person perspective and a third-
person perspective rather than experience two third-person perspectives, even though third-person perspectives were more
common overall. Interestingly, the percentage of memories accompanied by more than one perspective increased for more
recent memories: before ﬁrst grade = 20.93%, elementary school = 29.08%, middle school = 26.74%, high school = 37.21%, and
college = 38.83%. A similar effect was observed in Study 2.4.2.2. Relationship between perspective and vividness
To examine the relationship between the experience of multiple perspectives and imagery, three categories were cre-
ated: (1) memories accompanied by only a ﬁrst-person perspective, (2) memories accompanied by only a third-person per-
spective, and (3) memories accompanied by more than one perspective. The three imagery ratings (i.e., the clarity of the
image, how integral the perspective was, and if the memory came with a distinct perspective) were each analyzed using a
3-level (perspective: ﬁrst, third, or multiple) between-subjects ANOVA. Each question was examined separately for each of
the ﬁve time periods. This resulted in 15 ANOVAs; thus, to correct for multiple comparisons, a p-value of .003 (i.e., .05/15)
was used.
Examining image clarity, there were no signiﬁcant differences. When comparing how integral their perspective was to the
memory, differences were observed for elementary school, F(2, 83) = 6.73. When memories were accompanied by a ﬁrst-
person (M = 5.85, SD = 0.99) or third-person (M = 5.06, SD = 1.62) perspectives, the perspective was rated as more integral
than when there were multiple perspectives (M = 4.04, SD = 1.57). A similar pattern was observed for the other time periods
although the differences were not signiﬁcant.
Examining if participants felt their memory came with a distinct perspective, there was a difference for elementary
school, F(2, 82) = 6.46, and college memories, F(2, 82) = 9.19. For both of these comparisons, ﬁrst-person perspectives
(Melementary = 5.77, SDelementary = 0.98;Mcollege = 6.29, SDcollege = 1.05) were considered to come with a more distinct perspective
than both memories with a third-person perspective (Melementary = 5.19, SDelementary = 1.51; Mcollege = 5.33, SDcollege = 1.55)
and multiple perspectives (Melementary = 4.56, SDelementary = 1.23; Mcollege = 4.88, SDcollege = 1.27).Table 6
Percent of memories accompanied by a secondary perspective as a function of dominant perspective in Study 3.
Dominant perspective Secondary perspective
First-person Third-person None
First-person (33.57%) – 10.02 23.54
Third-person (66.43%) 13.52 6.99 45.92
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Across the ﬁve time periods, the percentage of dominant third-person perspective memories were as follows: before ﬁrst
grade = 77.65%, elementary school = 74.42%, middle school = 70.59%, high school = 71.43%, and college = 61.18%, with the
percentage of third-person perspectives showing an increasing pattern as memories become more remote consistent with
existing data.
Comparing the number of memories described with a dominant ﬁrst- and third-person perspective across genders re-
vealed only one difference. Females reported more dominant third-person perspectives only for memories from before ﬁrst
grade, v2 = (1, N = 37) = 4.54. This was determined by comparing the number of ﬁrst- and third-person perspectives provided
by females and males using a separate chi-square test for each time period. Speciﬁcally, the proportions of ﬁrst- and third-
person dominant perspectives provided by females were treated as expected proportions. The frequencies of ﬁrst- and third-
person perspectives provided by males were treated as the observed frequencies and compared with the expected frequen-
cies (based on data from females).5. Discussion
Across three studies, using a range of methodologies, the preponderance of evidence supported the independent frame-
work over the complementary and mutually exclusive frameworks. In Study 1, participants used the entire range of re-
sponses on a single, continuous scale and changed their perspective in a continuous manner. In Study 2, participants
rated their memories as high on scales of both ﬁrst- and third-person perspectives, supporting the notion that memories
can be accompanied by more than one perspective. Moreover, ratings of ﬁrst- and third-person perspectives correlated dif-
ferentially with vividness ratings, which is inconsistent with a complementary framework. Evidence from Study 3, in which
participants’ described their experience of perspective, further supported the independent framework; the majority of par-
ticipants reported experiencing more than one perspective for at least one memory.
These ﬁndings are important for several reasons. First, they clarify the construct of perspective; the experience of per-
spective during a single retrieval attempt is not either ﬁrst-person or third-person, it can be both. Although others have
made this point (e.g., Huebner & Fredrickson, 1999), investigators still use methods that do not capture this type of expe-
rience. If we are to accurately characterize perspective in future studies, we must allow individuals to respond in a way
that reﬂects their phenomenological experience. Second, our ﬁndings suggest that other phenomenological variables may
relate differentially to the experience of the two perspectives. In Study 2, vividness ratings correlated with ﬁrst-person
perspective ratings, but not with third-person perspective ratings. It is possible that other variables that have been shown
to relate to perspective, such as emotional intensity, relate differentially to the two perspectives. Third, knowing that indi-
viduals can experience more than one perspective during a single retrieval episode generates many new questions for
investigation. For example, how do individuals experience multiple perspectives? One possibility is that individuals switch
from one distinct perspective to another distinct perspective. However, it may be that they experience multiple perspec-
tives simultaneously. Informal conversations with participants suggest it is the former, but future investigations should
examine these alternatives. If individuals do, in fact, switch between perspectives, examining how often and how quickly
these switches occur will further our understanding of the phenomenological experience of perspective. Furthermore, it
will be important to explore how memories accompanied by multiple perspectives ﬁt into previous ﬁndings, such as
the ﬁnding that memories accompanied by ﬁrst-person perspectives tend to be more emotionally intense than third-per-
son perspectives.
Based on the current ﬁndings, it is recommended that future studies of perspective use methods that allow participants to
report the experience of more than one perspective. Asking individuals to describe their perspective likely provides the most
direct measurement of their experience. However, these responses can be difﬁcult to code. A more generally feasible method
would be to use two scales, which also allows the relationship between perspective and other variables to be examined in a
straightforward way.
One drawback of the current set of investigations is that it is unclear exactly how participants are using intermediate val-
ues on the single scale used in Study 1. For example, in Study 1, it is unclear what the endorsement of 4 means; it is possible
it reﬂects the experience of both perspectives, a weak experience of a particular perspective, or the lack of a clear perspective.
In fact, it is possible that different participants endorse intermediate values for different reasons. Using two scales, one for
ﬁrst-person and one for third-person where participants indicate the strength of each separately, helps solve this problem. It
must be noted that the question of what intermediate values indicate has not been addressed in previous investigations, so it
is unclear exactly how individuals used these values in previous studies. However, the use of the single scales has produced
reproducible ﬁndings, and we do not argue that previous ﬁndings are invalid.
As shown in Study 2, a complementary approach does an adequate job of accounting for participants’ experience of per-
spective. Approximately 80% of rating combinations were accounted for by using a lenient complementary approach. In
addition, ratings of ﬁrst-person perspective and third-person perspective were highly negatively correlated. This suggests
that often, when a memory is accompanied by a strong experience of one perspective, there is less experience of the other.
However, using the complementary approach does not account for the experience of multiple perspectives during a retrieval
episode, as shown by the responses in the lower right hand corner of Fig. 3. Thus, we argue that the independent framework
is a more accurate representation of the experience of perspective.
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mutually exclusive and complementary frameworks allow investigators to ﬁnd effects when they exist. However, these
frameworks are likely less sensitive than using the independent framework.
Importantly, the current investigation highlights the robustness of the relationship between perspective and memory age.
Regardless of the method used, remote memories were rated as more third-person perspective and less ﬁrst-person perspec-
tive compared to recent memories. In addition, we found that ﬁrst-person perspective ratings correlated with vividness rat-
ings, whereas third-person perspective ratings did not. This suggests that constructing a ﬁrst-person perspective may require
more detailed visual information about the event. This assertion is supported by a study demonstrating that when partici-
pants were blindfolded while encoding events, they experienced third-person perspectives at retrieval more often than
when they were permitted to encode visual information (Rubin, Burt, & Fiﬁeld, 2003). Therefore, one possible explanation
for the effect of memory age may be the loss of visual and other sensory detail or a decrease in the vividness of the memory.
Finally, a gender effect was observed across two studies, with females experiencing more third-person perspective and
less ﬁrst-person perspective compared to males. This replicates and extends a previous study examining gender differences
and perspective (Huebner & Fredrickson, 1999). This study found that when estimating how often they used ﬁrst-person and
third-person perspective during recall, females reported using third-person perspectives more often than males. In addition,
females reported more third-person perspectives when recalling an event in which they were more likely to feel sexually
objectiﬁed compared to males. Huebner and Fredrickson, (1999) predicted this pattern of results based on objectiﬁcation
theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997), which posits that females, due to cultural inﬂuences that objectify the female body,
learn to take a third-person perspective of their own body. Thus, they are more likely to use third-person perspectives when
recalling events, particularly those in which they might have felt objectiﬁed. To our knowledge, the current investigation is
the ﬁrst to ﬁnd a gender effect without directing participants to recall certain types of situations or to ask for an estimate of
how often an individual uses a particular perspective. Although the current results are consistent with objectiﬁcation theory,
further investigation is necessary to explain gender differences in perspective.
Taken together, our results demonstrate that individuals can experience more than one perspective during a single retrie-
val attempt. Future studies should use techniques that capture this in order to accurately characterize the experience of per-
spective. First-person and third-person perspectives differentially correlated with vividness, further suggesting that the
experience of the two perspectives is independent. In addition, the effect of memory age on perspective was found regardless
of the method used to measure perspective, suggesting this is a robust and real effect that requires explanation.
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Appendix A
A.1. Perspective description from Study 1
When remembering an event from their lives, most people imagine the scene in one of two ways. One way that people
remember an event is as an outside observer, or onlooker, looking at the situation from an external vantage point (e.g. a bird’s
eye view), where the person remembering can see him or herself in the memory. Another way that people remember an
event is through their own eyes, from roughly the same viewpoint that it was originally experienced.
On the following page is a list of ﬁve speciﬁc time periods. Please think of a memory for one event from each time period
(making a one or two word note to yourself of what the memory is) and then rate whether the memory comes to you as
though you were an outside observer or as though you were seeing it through your own eyes. We ask that you circle one
number between one and seven on the rating scale to indicate the perspective. There are no correct answers; we are just try-
ing to document the kinds of memories people have.
A.2. Perspective description from Study 2
When remembering an event from their lives, most people imagine the scene in one of two ways. One way that people
remember an event is as an outside observer, or onlooker, looking at the situation from an external vantage point (e.g., a bird’s
eye view), where the person remembering can see him or herself in the memory. Another way that people remember an
event is through their own eyes, from roughly the same viewpoint that it was originally experienced. For some memories,
it may be that you remember it from only your own eyes and not at all from an observer’s perspective or that you remember
it from an observer’s perspective and not all from your own eyes. It may also be that you experience both perspectives for a
single memory, such that the image you experience oscillates between two or more perspectives while thinking about an
event.
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(making a one or two word note to yourself of what the memory is) and rate how vivid your memory is. Then, rate the degree
to which the memory comes to you as though you were an outside observer and the degree to which the memory comes to
you from your own eyes. We ask that you circle one number between one and seven on the rating scale to indicate the viv-
idness, degree of observer perspective, and degree of own eye perspective. There are no correct answers; we are just trying to
document the kinds of memories people have.References
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